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IRISH COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW VOL51995 
New media technologies in 
Europe: the politics of satellite, 
HDTVand DAB 
Hans J. Kleinsteuber 
Introduction 
It has been lhe tradition in Europe to develop media technologies at national level 
with close cooperation between the state and the private sector, and frequently with 
competition between different states and their industrial Infrastructures. The creation of 
new technologies mostly occurred within lhe electric, and later the electronics industry 
and included studio equipment, transmitters and receivers; it also included those 
industries supplying equipment to areas such as telecommunications. optics and the 
aerospace indus t ry. The state has always provided some of the central players. for 
example, Post Office administrations (Telecoms) , research ministries, the military sector 
and in particular, the public service broadcasters (Fllchy, 1994: 164ff. 228ft). 
During the 1980's a Europeani7-atlon of research and development took place that 
was accompanied by quick and wide-ranging changes In the development of media 
technologies. This process occurred on several levels: 
• The overall number of broadcasting stations was Increased in Europe with the 
utilization of direct satellite transmission and/or via cable: 
• New technologies facilitated European-wide reception of1V; 
• For the first time, new technologies were no longer developed at national level (as it 
was the case with earlier innovations such as colour 1V, stereo 1V etc.) but through 
supranationa l cooperation between electronic companies, with European financing; 
this was especially the case for HD1V and digital radio transmission. 
This paper focuses on three technologies that demonstrate the wide s pectrum of the 
new developments; these are Direct Broadcasting Satellites (DBS). High Defmition 
Television (HD1V) and Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB). The development of DBS was 
largely steered by market forces whereas HD1V had been initiated by the EC/EU1 and 
other European institutions such as EUREKA; DAB is being developed with European 
support in a limited number ofEU countries (Kleinsteuber and Rossmann, 1994: 116f0. 
Satellites 
Satellite technology started as a resu lt of the technological rivalry between lhe Soviet 
Union and the US with a strong emphasis on military a pplications. At the beginning. 
Europe was not a serious actor. In 1962. for the first time, the US satellite TELSTAR 
transmitted transatlantic TV images: in 1965 the US began regular satellite 
broadcasting. From 1964 until the 1970's, INTELSAT, which was US-con trolled and 
which operated worldwide, transmitted to Europe. Europe itself remained passive and 
even Canada had launched communication satellites long before the Europeans. During 
the 1970's, however, Europe was haunted by the s pectre of the 'American challenge'. 
This led a number of countries to boost their policies and spending on media technology 
in order to avoid dependency on the US. Initially satellite projects were s till national (1V-
SAT. TDF) , followed later by European activities, partly at government (EUTELSAT) , 
partly at commercial level (ASTRA) (Jahnson. 1993. Collins. 1992). 
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To get away from INTELSAT, European satellite projects, backed at llr:;t lJy U1e 
European Space Agency (ESA) began to move forward. Satellite TV started in Europe in 
1978 with the orbital test satellite (OTS) of ESA, a low frequency Telecom satellite, 
designed to serve cable stations. In 1977, EUTELSAT had been set up by eighteen 
Telecom administrations as a European satellHe operator. launching communication 
satellites of its own from 1983 (ECS-F-1 and F-2) (Ostergaard, 1986). As early as 1984, 
France had put its first national satellite into orbit: this was built by Matra and named 
TELECOM 1. Since then French satelUtes have been supplying the former French 
colonial tenitories with TV programmes. 
At that time, it was thought that European technological self-sufficiency would be 
achieved by a completely new satellite specification which was aimed not only at 
catching up with the Americans but overtaking them. This was the direct transmission 
satellite (DBS) which bypasses cable systems and beams 1V programmes directly into 
homes (Direct-to-Home, DTH). It featured a low number of transponders, a national 
'footprint' (transmission radius) and high powered signals so that - leaving cable aside -
a relatively small dish antenna would be needed for reception. The 1977 World 
Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) allotted the necessary frequencies. Prototypes 
of this line were the German TV-SAT and the French TDF with five channels each. 
followed by the British Marco Polo and the Swedish Tele-X. 
Let us take the German example. In 1977. several large firms from the German. 
electronics and aerospace industry were commissioned to develop the first DBS 
specification. The concept of DBS reflected the aim of the then social-liberal government 
coalition to minimize the number of new channels In order to safeguard public service 
broadcasting, but. at the same time, to demonstrate German 'high tech' competence. In 
1981, the Federal Republic and France agreed on coordinated DBS development. The 
first satellite TV-SAT 1 was launched in 1988 but, owing to technical defects, was a total 
failure. TV-SAT 2. TDF- 1 and TDF-2 went into orbit in 1990 with several channels of 
TDF not working. As part of government satellite policy, these satellites were Ued to the 
D2-MAC policies of the EC (see below) and thus limited In their Influence. At the end of 
1994 TV-SAT ended transmission of TV programmes, demonstrating that this 
specification had been developed outside of market considerations and was no longer of 
much use. 
Because satellite policy was under the direct control of EUTELSAT and the national 
Telecoms, competition could only come from outside Europe. A consortium of US origin 
entered the field with an American built. hybrid type satellite under the formal charge of 
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg (Noam, 1991: 299 fO. Its special characteristics were a 
large number of channels. a pan-European 'footprint' and the potential for DTH 
reception. At that time, this advance met with biller resistance from European Telecom 
administrations and was only finaJly accepted because the project was set up with 
capital from a European consortium. The Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES). 
established In 1985, comprised financial institutions, banking houses and TV producers 
from the Federal Republic, Luxemburg, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Great Britain 
(Ahrens, 1992; Kleinsteuber, 1991). 
The first SES satellite, manufactured like all others in the US, was ASTRA 1 A, 
launched at the end of 1988 with sixteen and later, eighteen channels. After a test period. 
It turned out to be an absolute winner. By November 1994, a total of four satellites bad 
been placed in orbit with up to 68 channels. More ASTRA launches are planned for 1995-
96: the first all-digital satellite will start transmission In 1995. Prices for ASTRA antennas 
have dropped in recent years and are now as low as ECU 200 or less. According to 
ASTRA figures, their satelLites serve approximately fifteen million households throughout 
Europe with up to six million in Germany. (There Is a high penetration in East Germany, 
because of the lack of cable TV). ln Eastern Europe, too, ASTRA has a large. although 
hardly measurable 'shadow' clientele. ASTRA holds approximately ninety per cent of the 
DBS market and is thus almost In monopoly position. 
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Table 1 
PENETRATION OF NEW MEDIA IN WESTERN EUROPE 1993 
(SELECJED INDICATORS) 
TV House- Cable Cable 
hold connections penetration 
In millions In 1000s In % 
2.99 967 32.30 
3.80 3,725 98.00 
2.30 1,323 57.30 
2.15 780 36.30 
20.45 1.206 5.90 
Satellite TV 
Receivers 
Number 
max500.000 
10.000 
65.000 
15.000 
max 350.000 
min 33.40 13.116 39.30 max 4.200.000 
3.09 min min 2.000 
1.00 400 40.00 max50,000 
20.30 min min max 100.000 
0.14 117 81.40 1.500 
6.20 5.700 92.00 max250,000 
1.05 642 36.60 max 160.000 
3.14 10 0.32 100,000 
11.35 749 6.60 150,000 
3.84 1,931 50.30 325,000 
2.47 1.908 77.10 max40.000 
22.08 504 2.28 2,662.000 
Source: Cable and Satellite. Europe. 1994. 1: 56-65 
The first ASTRA channels were leased by the Murdoch group for its Sky project that 
later changed into the present British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) system, mainly a 
package of DBS pay programmes. Meantime. nearly all German and British commercial 
programmes are being transmitted via this satellite system and also an increasing 
number of publlc 1V offerings (ARD. ZDF, German Third Programmes, 3Sat and others) 
(Zimmer. 1993). In fact, ASTRA satellites serve not only the two most profitable 
European markets (Germany and Great Britain) Including relevant markets on the 
periphery (Austria, parts of Switzerland, Ireland), but have achieved an immense lead 
over its main competitor EUTELSAT (Schmitt-Beck and Dietz, 1993). ASTRA is the 
pacemaker in European satellite development and very much ruined the strategies of 
the European Telecoms. The German Telecom accepted the new situation: while 
remaining part of EUTELSAT. It bought a large share (17 per cent) In ASTRA's SES 
company In 1994. 
The essential characteristics of the emerging European satellite system are very 
much the opposite of what were the declared goals of EC media policy: 
• ASTRA's satellites have been produced in the US and do not support Europe's 
space industry; 
• the operator is a private consortium (SES) outside of any effective European regulation: 
• the new DBS transmission norm decided upon by the EC Is 02-MAC. but ASTRA 
continues to work in PAL (see below). 
ASTRA's success marks a completely new situation in Europe. Until its emergence. 
new broadcasting technologies had been decreed 'from the lop', based on an a lliance of 
industry, Telecoms and public service broadcasters. With SES though. a different type of 
commercial ope.rator arrived that may choose to · refuse any politically desired technical 
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standards, lf it does not suit Its commercial lnterest:s. It dot:s nol seem possible to 
Impose regulations on ASTRA, a fact which had been warned against at an early stage 
but was Ignored (Taishoff, 1987). The establishment of SES In Luxemburg is only 
formal, some programmes for Britain (BSkyB) for example have never been licensed. 
EUTELSAT is the only recognizable competitor of ASTRA. It transmits TV 
programmes (about forty) on seven satellites, but is. for the most part, a supplier for 
cable networks. EUTELSAT employs DBS satellites which operate, however, from a 
different orbital position and have no chance against those from ASTRA which has a 
market share of about ninety percent In Europe. In 1996 EUTELSAT plans to launch 
two digital DBS satellites of the HOT BIRD type (EUTELSAT. 1993). 
Satellites and digital television 
Current plans are for a new type of 'digital television· to be introduced within the next 
few years. This will not take the form of an all-digitallzed line of transmission between 
studio and screen, but the digital transport of images fed Into conventional (i.e. 
analogue) 1V sets. The advantage lies in the fact that via the channels already available 
- cable or satellite - a considerable number of programmes (up to ten per channel) can 
be transmitted. An ASTRA satellite with eighteen transponders now would then be able 
to deliver up to 180 programmes. 
It is evident that there is hardly any room for further expansion of advertising on 
commercial television In Europe. Further programme services are therefore planned 
through subscription 1V, Including pay-per-view; teleshopping channels are also In the 
pipe-line. For payment a simple feedback mode is planned which will work as a digital 
signal via the telephone network. In order to introduce the new technology in Germany, 
the frrms of Bertelsmann and Kirch - which, together with Canal Plus. run PREMIERE. 
the only Pay-1V channel on the German market - established a joint venture with the 
German Telecom, named Media Service GmbH (MSG) at the beginning of 1994. The 
economic power thus brought together by the three largest media actors has been 
sharply criticized and the EU banned the project in November 1994. 
Other European actors like Burda, Bauer, CLT have continuously attacked this 
scheme and started their own planning, based more on terrestrial networks and the 
American concept of Interactive television. An international consortium, including 
Matra-Hachette, the Pearson group and Burda will introduce Europe Online, modelled 
on America Online (run by Meigher Communication, which is also participating} and 
offering Interactive services, based on computer transmission. 
For a long time, there were no substantial EC/EU policies which reflected these new 
developments. Until recently, the EC separated planning and organization for the media 
from telecommunication policies. as the different general directorates in charge show. 
Since the 1980's the EC has been very active In European telecommunication policies 
and has sought harmonization, liberalization and universal access (Steinfield, Bauer 
and Caby, 1994; Mansell, 1993). These guidelines bad been Inspired by pan-European 
business enterprises with the aim of improving European management communication. 
Over the years. the EC bas been active in planning and financing different Initiatives 
(KOM, 1994). Nevertheless, national Telecoms and their often conflicting interests In 
Europe remain the leading actors. In June 1994 the so-called Bangemann Group 
presented a paper calling for an Integrated European broadband network. In order to 
connect all telephone, cable and satellite networks via common transmission standards. 
In Europe, it now seems to have been realized also that digitalization is leading to a 
convergence of communications and media technologies. thus eliminating any 
differences between sound and Image. text and data as they all travel via the same 
binary signal. The need in Europe for new and efficient networks - as the Maastricht 
treaty particularly underlines- is undisputed and certainly part of a strategy of bringing 
Europeans closer together. Yet. the logic of networks is always bound up with the 
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particular interests of different actors and so far the developmen t of media networks has 
been mainly s timulated by large national actors with a tendency towards centralistic 
and hierarchical structures . 
A comparison wi th the US is evidence for this. The improvement of media 
'Superhighways' there has usually begun with · terres trial networks being 'scaled up' 
digitally and some interactive capabilities being introduced (MediaGruppe, 1994). 
lnteractivity as a concept is taken from the logic of computer networks. which work on a 
server-client basis (like Internet). The advantage of the concept of interactivity is that 
viewers get various options for feedback signals. e.g. for e-mail , access to on-line 
databanks. individually selecting electronic newsmagazines or they may even participate 
as active senders (Neumann, 1991). Digital communication technologies are interpreted 
in the US above all as 'Technologies of Freedom' (Pool. 1983), adding to the media a 
completely new quality of strengthening the individual. enlarging his range of choices 
and offering the chance of becoming personally active and thus less dependent on the 
existing media agglomerates. 
Comparing these con cepts with the leading pla ns In Europe , a fundamental 
difference appears. Satellite channels of the ASTRA type are not suited for interactlvity. 
they only allow uni-directional communication. This supports the s trategy of the largest 
European media companies. like MSG, which prefer a technology that offers 'more of the 
same', as such providing more conventional 'IV channels. The situation is quite different 
in the US. where the telecom and computer (hardware and software) industries are on 
the move to build up the digital and interactive media structures of the future in order 
to take market share away from the conventional broadcasting industry (mainly the 
three large networks) (Kleinsteuber. 1994a). As was mentioned, European actors are 
choosing the 'American Way· also. as the Europe Online example shows. 
New television transmission standards: HDTV 
HD1V was developed in a 'high-tech triad' that included Europe. Japan and US. As a 
technology. HDTV represen ts the next generation of1V technology which entails at least 
a doubling of the number of lines that make up the 1V picture (Kleinsteuber. 1994. 
Bischoff. 1993) . TV's history may be seen as a s u ccession of stages. each one 
characterized by an increase In the number of lines. During past decades. TV screens 
were made larger but the density of lines remained the same. Increasing the number of 
lines looked like a natural solution (HDTV in Japan 1125 lines. Europe 1250). The 
resulting HD1V image can be projected upon a much larger screen: the image is more 
detailed and is presented in wide screen format (16:9 ratio). The quality of reproduction . 
or so the promoters argue. parallels that of the cinema. 
HD1V with its greater number of lines needs larger channels for signal transmission, at 
least as far as the analogue method is concerned (Prentiss. 1993, ZDF. 1991). That is why, 
earlier on, HDTV had not been designed for terrestrial broadcasting but only for digital 
sateiUte transmission (Japan) or for digital satellites with cable distribution (Europe). Only 
the US gave consideration to terrestrial transmission whereby the original channel 
remains and a second independent channel transports the additional HDTV signals. 
HD1V. to be sure. conforms to common physical and scien tific laws. Nevertheless, 
practical application in the three high-tech region s mentioned above disclosed certain 
peculiarities to be allowed for. as for instance the availability of frequencies in the 
electro-magnetic spectrum, geogra phical conditions. population density. Different 
traditions and experiences as to government policies concerning technology, industry 
and standards have to be taken into consideration as well. Last but not least, the parties 
and persons concerned with the development of technical innovations are very different 
indeed. Over the years, changing coalitions and competitions have appeared in the 
'high-tech triad' in the tradition of 'capitalistic rtval.ries' as we know it from other fields of 
high technology (Hart. 1992). 
15 
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HDTV experimental work was Initiated in Japan where research in the field of new 
1V technologies had been going on since the 1960's. As a central actor there emerged 
the public-service broadcaster Nippon Hoso Kyoka (NHK) whose laboratories started 
a round 1980. and which sought cooperation from interested Japanese private firms 
(Nf-IK, 1992; Kenji, 1990). The result was the development of a Japanese 1-IDTV 
specification. called Hi-Vision/Muse, based mainly on an extension of the conventional 
analogue technology. Since 1990, receivers for HDTV have been on the market, but they 
are extremely expensive and up to 1994 only about 20,000 have been sold. One HDTV 
programme via satellite has been offered on an experimental base for several years. 
During the early 1980's, Europe watched the Japanese efforts with growing 
scepticism. The electronics industry had been confronted with the fact that a large share 
of the market for hi-ll equipment was being lost to producers from the Far East. In light 
of the Japanese success on the US market for TV sets. It was suspected that the same 
would happen to European manufacturers. The European market had been protected 
because patents for PAL and SECAM were only selectively passed on to Japanese 
competitors whose share of the European 1V set market In 1986 was just fourteen per 
cent. But gradually these patents were going to expire. The EC started to react when. at 
the 1986 CCIR conference. the Japan ese urged the introduction of global HDTV 
specifications. based on their HiViston. HDTV was declared a key technology for Europe 
that had to be developed independently from Japan. Preconditions for any European 
HDTV policies would be incompatibility with Japanese standards and the exclusion of 
the Japanese from research (Meyer-Stamer. 1994; Niblock. 1991). 
In Europe. too, preliminary studies for new TV technologies had been made, starting 
with Great Britain in the late 1970's. The engineering division of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) developed the system Multiplexed Analogue Components 
(MAC) to be applied mainly In DBS satelli tes as a transmission technology to avoid 
colour distortion in TV images. In 1986 the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) 
stipulated tha t MAC was to be the new European standard for all future DBS projects. 
In the same year. the EC Issued a directive according to which m ember states were 
committed to applying MAC exclusively in all DBS satellite transmissions. During the 
following years the European Council and the EC repeatedly announced the urgent need 
for the Introduction of an all-European HDTV service. 
A particularity of the European approach to HDTV was that the introduction was to 
be in two stages with compatibility between each. According to these plans, first D2-
MAC (in Great Britain D-MAC) would be introduced with Improvements in quality of 
image and sound , and In wide screen format (16:9), but with conventional density. 
During the second phase the number of lines would be doubled to 1,250 to provide for 
HD-MAC. Both specifications were planned to be partly digital, the actual transmission 
to continue to be analogue. 
Beginning in 1986, HDTV received massive government sponsorship. Within the 
scope of the EUREKA programme, project EU 95 was set up with a capital input of ECU 
625 f!!illion for research and development in support of HDTV. The consortium was 
headed by the two electronic companies Philips of the Netherlands and the French state 
controlled corporation Thomson: forty firms from ten countries participated. 
A number of other EUREKA projects - BiSchoff in his analysis counts eight - also 
related to HDTV (Bischoff 1993: 126). The JESSI programme (EU 125) was to bring 
European industry up to world standard in the developmen t of computer chips. To 
safeguard HDTV policies. the RACE programme tested glass fibre cables in a 'fibre-to-
home' structure to feed HDTV programmes. Parts of the MEDIA scheme for the 
advancement of audiovisual production and dis tribution in Europe were made ready for 
an early start to HDTV. Europe's filmmakers were encouraged to employ HD1V in film 
production. By the end of 1991. more than OM 800 mll1ion had been spent on the 
promotion of MAC via EU 95 (Bischoff. 1993: 153). There was also national HDTV 
promotion: i.e. in the Federal Republic. the two ministries responsible for research and 
telecommunications. had contributed approximately OM 100 million by 1992. 
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In the following years. HD1V was styled a prestige European project and the European 
Commission gave generous public relations support. 'The Commission is helping to 
ensure that the Community has an integrated HDTV strategy, involving all the different 
industries which must work together for the successful introduction of HDTV services in 
the 1990s.' (KOM, 1991). On the initiative of the EC. Interested parties from the 
electronics industry and programme providers came together In 1990 to found 'VIsion 
1250' which was to promote the production of HDTV programme material. The Olympic 
Games of 1992 in Barcelona were the chosen occasion to demonstrate for the frrst time 
the whole range of HDTV technology and to offer HDTV programming to the public. 
Nevertheless. the project was ill-fated once the adoption of MAC-generation had been 
declared an absolute European necessity in order to end the split between PAL and 
SECAM standards. In fact. national solu tions were tolerated - Great Britain pushed 
through its incompatible variation named D-MAC. The two leading actors Philips and 
Thomson, sponsored mainly by their home governments. were both badly prepared and In 
economic difficulties; it was argued that EC capital helped to restore them both to health. 
But the major handicap was that the transition to MAC had been virtually decreed by 
the EC 'from the top'. Those who were supposed to benefit most from HDTV. the 
television broadcasters. were hardly interested. Public service broadcasters feared to be 
deprived of their accustomed leading position in developing new media technologies, but 
they were obliged to face giant Investments despite growing financial problems. 
Notwithstanding their legitimate problems and reservations. they were expected to obey 
and cooperate on these matters of political concern. 
On the other hand. the 1980's in Europe had witnessed the growth of a new 
commercial TV industry which maintained an attitude of blunt rejection of HDTV. This 
industry had just introduced TV funded by a dvertising at high fmancial risk and did not 
want to bother with the uncertainties of new technologies. The president of the 
Association of Commercial Television (ACT). Werner Klatten, stated in 1992: "The 
procedure of the Commission concerning 02-MAC was typical of the Idea of 
harmonization by regulation and Is. thank God. a failure" (European Institute for the 
Media. 1992: 18). Moreover. we know from the US example that commercial TV 
suppliers prefer an attitude of strong technological conservatism. Accordingly, the 
leading commercial satellite company ASTRA and large programme su ppliers like 
Murdoch's Sky Television stuck to conventional PAL which became the dominant DBS 
norm. Those holding on to 02-MAC such as the users of the German-French DBS 
satellites (of the TV-SAT type) or the British commercial DBS project BSB suffered heavy 
losses for lack of adequate decoders and significant consumer interest. 
The outright rejection of 02-MAC by commercial broadcasters created a difficult 
situation for the promoters of HDTV. In a 'Memorandum of Understanding' of August 
1990, the German TV suppliers. the electronics industry. Telecom and the Ministry for 
Post and Telecommunications were more or less forced to come to an agreement and 
support the introduction of MAC. 
What looked like a perfectly organized action similar to previous successful strategies 
by the EC was contradicted by the reality that ASTRA and PAL continued to dominate 
the market. The appliance industry was quite right in assuming that there was no mass 
market in MAC and took time in offering reasonably priced sets. Some programmes were 
indeed additionally transmitted In 02-MAC via DBS satellites and Telecom cable, but 
this strategy - like the whole concerted action - seemed to be at a dead end. Similar 
results have been observed in other European countries. especially in Great Britain and 
France (Niblock, 1991: 59ff). In 1991. the first 02-MAC sets produced by Thomson came 
on the market at a price of approximately OM 10.000. In 1993 the price dropped to DM 
3,000. During the frrst two years, according to information from the manufacturers, ·a 
few thousand wide screen sets' had been sold in Germany (Wirtschaftswoche. 20 
August. 1993: 60). 
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The main opponents to the adoption of the MAC specification were. as the example 
above shows, the commercial programme-makers and satellite suppliers. Faced with 
their delaying tactics, the EC tried to use its authority to force a breakthrough of 02-
MAC. a policy much associated with the commissioner responsible, Pandolfi. In several 
powerful actions the Commission prepared a directive according to which all new 
suppliers of satellite programmes would be obliged to transmit in 02-MAC and all large 
TV sets would be equipped with D2-MAC decoders. In a 'Memorandum of 
Understanding' the EC tried to get all parties concerned to accept this line. The EC 
planned a new five year scheme wlth a budget of ECU 850 million to s ubsidize 
programme production in wide screen 16:9 format and transmission in 02-MAC. This 
impli~d that satellite programmes were to be transmitted in 02-MAC at EC expense: a 
parallel service for the audience in PAL ('simulcasting') could remain (KOM. 1992a). 
Cable systems were to be provided with D2-MAC as well. From 1991 onwards. Philips, 
Thomson and the French Ministry for Research exerted pressure to ban PAL altogether 
after 1994. 
These EC policies were formed at a time when it had already become clear that 02-MAC 
could be nothing more than a transitional standard, and the whole MAC system seemed to 
be more and more out of line with developments elsewhere. For the first time opposition 
arose in the European Parliament against HD1V policy, mainly from environment and 
consumer associations who objected to the amount of money spent on HD1V. 
The MAC strategy of the EC as it had been drawn up in 1991/92 collapsed despite 
enormous concessions made to 1V broadcasters. The major opponent of the plan had 
been Great Britain, an EC country with little domestic electronics industry, but a 
relatively large number of Japanese affiliates and also home for mosl commercial 
transnational 1V broadcasters in Europe. Britain did however show interest in EC 
subsidies for its own industry, mainly for the development of genetic engineering. The 
meeUng of the European Council in December 1992 put an end to the MAC-led policy. 
In January 1993 Philips announced a complete stop in the production of HD-MAC sets 
(Understanding and Outlook, 1993). At the end of 1994, transmission in D2-MAC via 
1V-SAT ended in Germany. 
In mid 1993 the Telecom ministers of the EC managed to convince Britain to agree to 
the following arrangement: during the next four years, ECU 228 million were to be made 
available to support programme development for wide screen 1V (16:9). The new EC 
commissioner Martin Bangemann, successor to Pandolfi, announced rather vaguely: 
'Many exciting new television services - including high definition television - will be 
introduced on to the market over the next few years. but the wide screen 16:9 standard 
will be common to them all' (quoted in Broadcast. 25 June, 1993). The British consented 
because the European subsidiaries of Japanese frrms will be allowed to participate, 
which is particularly relevant to Sony. 
The .EC policy concealed the fact that other less spectacular efforts were being made 
In Europe. The EC had offered its support to a group of mostly large companies and 
gave them publicity, whilst small frrms and research Institutions received hardly any 
attention. A very small consortium from Scandinavia, though, managed to develop a 
digital HD1V specification of its own named HD-Oivine (Digital Video Narrow-band 
Emission) for just OM 6 million. 
Another new foundation Is the Europea n Launching Group on Digital Video 
Broadcast in Europe (ELG/DVB), comprising the EBU (i.e. public-service broadcasters), 
European Telecoms and representatives of lhe electronics industry. This group is aiming 
to introduce a frrst version of digital television In 1995 (BMPT, 1993:5) with the main 
focus, it seems. on digital compression. Here, too, EC money has been made available 
for grants in the region of OM 500 million for a programme called Advanced Digital 
Television Techniques (ADTT). 
18 
IRISH COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW VOL51995 
Public service broadcasters in cooperation with the electronics Industry are the 
driving force behind a further development of conventional technology which seems to 
conform better to the market: PALplus. It carries on the PAL standard in an evolutionary 
and compatible way. PALplus transmission will be analogue on 6 Mhz as part of 
conventional terrestrial service, but will also o(fer the 16:9 standard for Images with 
better quality by a progressive build-up of the 625 lines together with Improved sound. 
Developments are being carried on by. among others the German ARD and ZDF. the 
British BBC and the Dutch NOB. In 1994 ftlms were first shown on German 1V in 
PALplus on ARD, ZDF and the pay-TV channel PREMIERE. Transmission will be 
subsidized by approximately OM 450 million under the wide screen programme of the 
EU mentioned above. 
Digital HDTV in the US and Japan 
During the l 980's an understanding prevailed ln the US that, because of a lack of 
domestic producers of 'IV technology, an independent HD1V policy was not possible. At 
Urnes Japanese or European developments were supported and adaptions to the specific 
situation of the US planned (e.g. possibility of terrestrial transmission). Initiatives for 
separate American HD1V developments were started in the late 1980's, and, unlike 
Europe, were accompanied by a broad public discourse in the academic community and 
hearings before different committees of Congress (Prentiss, 1993; CasaBlanca, 1992: 
Benson and Fink. 1991). American Investment in HD1V was seen as an instrument of 
industrial policy, serving the recovery of key segments of the economy and securing 
America's future. There was strong demand for subsidies for HD1V by members of the 
Democratic party in Congress (amongst them the then Senator AI Gore). but any active 
HD1V policy was refused by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. In consequence, 
HDTV development remained on the agenda in the US, but received almost no 
gove.rnment support. 
In 1987. the FCC (Federal Communication Commission- eds.) began procedures to 
clarify the technical and legal aspects of HD1V and Invited applications to present a 
HDTV standard by mid 1990. independent institutes were to check the bids and select 
the best choice. Japan applied with a version of their H!Vision/Muse and withdrew later. 
the Europeans Philips and Thomson joined Ame.rican companies in a large consortium. 
1'wo days before the final deadline a small American high-tech firm announced its bid 
for an all-digitalized standard, i.e. a standard based on computer technology. 
The resulting tests demonstrated that digital HD1V is going to be the solution of the 
future; it offers a simpler, more flexible and more reasonably priced alternative to the 
analogue specifications of Europe and Japan. In 1994 a 'grand alliance' was formed of 
large US firms together with Phllips and Thomson to develop a final version of digital 
HDTV, scheduled to be demonstrated in 1995. American plans are to utilize the 
emerging digital 'information superhighway' for HD1V transmission. 
In Japan HD1V of the HiVision type has shown very little growth. But any proposals 
to stop its spread have been attacked and put down so far. On 25 November,l994 a 
regular HiVision programme via satellite was introduced, jointly produced by NHK and 
commercial broadcasters. Wide screen 1V of the PALplus type has been introduced in 
Japan with much more positive reaction from consumers. 
Digital Audio Broadcasting: the technical and economic side 
An innovative step in radio technology was developed in the 1980's to counteract a 
number of technical deficits in analogue FM transmission: 
• FM transmission Is subject to interference on mobile receivers (cars etc.). In addition. 
interference is Increasing on account of the growing density in the range of FM 
frequencies and the heavy use of all kinds of electronic appliances. 
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• The FM signal is clearly more efficient tho.n the earlier AM signal, but still cannot 
compete with the hi-fi quality of digital signals. ln combination with digital audio 
storage already available (e.g. on CO-disc). digital radio would reach 'state-of-the-art' 
standard, and be able to compete with home CD recorder. 
Digital Satellite Radio (DSR) was first presented to the public at the Berlin 
Broadcasting Fair (Internationale FunkaussteiJung, IFA) of 1989. It offers selected radio 
programmes of digital quality transmitted either via satellite or cable. DSR is now mainly 
used for programmes of classical music from public service broadcasters. and for a 
small number of commercial programmes. At present the Hamburg cable system has 
sixteen DSR channels. DSR tuner equipment is available at prices from DM 500 
upwards". Up to now. though. DSR penetration is only minimal. 
Preliminary consideration was given to terrestrial digital transmission in 1980 and 
Initial testing started In 1985. mainly at the lnstltut fUr Rundfunktechnik (IRT) in 
Munich, a joint subsidiary of the public service broadcasters in Germany. In 1986, for 
the first time. the German Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFI1 got Involved In 
order to bring together industrial representatives of dif ferent states in a joint European 
research and development project. Since 1987. the development of DAB has been 
promoted on a large scale within the framework of the EUREKA project EU-147. During 
the four years 1987 to 1991, ECU 40 million was invested: for the second phase 1992 to 
1994. ECU 35 million have been made available (according to information given by the 
EU-14 7 project office). 
The Federal Republic has sought the position of initiator and chief promoter of DAB. 
A number of German electronic companies. public research institu tions, Telecom and 
the IRT are taking part, together with partners from France, the Netherlands and Great 
Britain. The German Research Ministry (BMFT) contributed DM 30 million to the first 
development phase. 
DAB standards were set up "in cooperation with public radio/1V institutions of the 
Federal Republic of Germany' and are as follows: 
• A high quality digital transmission mode, capable of lasting for the next fifty years 
and with options for multi-channel sound fidelity and data transmission (data radio). 
• Unrestricted mobile, portable and stationary reception: perfect reception to be 
ensured for portable sets and in moving cars. 
• A system with high transmission capacity for data channels to allow for broadcasting 
of additional information, i.e. traffic information. programme data. radiotext (DAB-
Platform. 1994). 
The initial intention in the Federal Republic was to broadcast UAB on Channel 12 
(223-230 Mhz). formerly a channel for military use. Channel 12 could also be used for 
DAB in some neighbouring Western European counlries. In Eastern Europe this 
channel Is being used by high powered 1V stations which cannot be easily allocated a 
different frequency. With a capacity of four frequency blocks with six programmes each. 
Channel 12 will not s uffice to convert all current s tations to digital transm ission. 
Therefore. and with respect to the Eastern European situation . it is planned to include 
1V channels in sector 1 (channels 2-4) as well. The latest plans are to utilize the high 
frequency L band that may take eight to nin.e channels and about fifty programmes. 
The development of media technology seems to be less an answer to consumer 
demand than a response to industrial politics. What counts are new industrial markets 
and behind the often publicly stated concern for job creation lies the profit motive. The 
German Post Ministry has revealed figures which support this assertion . Their 
predictions claim that. since new multi-norm radio sets will be needed, the DAB system 
offers European industry a mass market of approximately 600 million radio sets which 
require highly sophisticated chips (16M and 64 M technology). To facilitate DAB and FM 
20 
IRISH COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW VOL 51995 
radio during the starting phase, sets will be offered as multi-norm receivers. The annu~l 
output Is estimated at about DM 500 million. 
Actors in DAB 
Dominant among the organized Interests in DAB are the producers of equipment 
relevant for the production, transmission and receiving of digital radio programmes, all 
being part of the electronics industry. Another important actor Is the German Telecom, 
responsible for a large part of all radio transmitters, yet concerned with little else but 
transmission 'hardware·. It Is significant that DAB is being pushed by the Federal 
Republic's public service broadcasting system which has a long tradition In pav1ng the 
way for new technical specifications In the media field, for Instance stereo radio or Radio 
Data Systems (RDS). As far as technology goes, public service radio has traditionally 
been open to Innovation and is attempting to continue this policy in the age of dual 
competition. This also is in line with their obligation (as stated by the Federal 
Constitutional Court) 'to safeguard a basic supply not only with respect to the contents 
but also to the distribution of programmes·. 
In addition public service broadcasting partly transmits its own programming and 
consequently employs technical experts and supports the IRT. which Is central to the 
development of DAB. It turns out though that the leadership of the highly dP.c.P.ntralizeci 
public service broadcasting organization is split on DAB. some strongly supporting it (for 
example, Bavarian Broadcasting, Bavaria also being a centre of the electronics Industry). 
others being more reluctant and not participating In the DAB-Platform (see below). 
Sceptics argue that DAB experiments exceed the public sector's financial means 
whereas commercial competitors might have the use of it later. Indeed. it may well be 
lhat public service broadcasters are going to take the technical and financial risks but 
be left empty handed when it comes to turning it into profit: partly on account of 
insufficient financial means needed for marketing and parUy because politicians might 
hinder economic actions. 
The competing lobby organization of the commercial broadcasting industry (VPRT) 
shows an atutude of watching and waiting. They clearly have reasoned thus: 'the 
development of DAB Is of primary importance to industry. European equipment 
producers suffer sales losses and need ready markets.' Still in the process of 
establishing new commercial radio stations In the country. they show technological 
conservatism and have little enthusiasm for DAB. 
So far. only the German music industry. i.e. the producers of COs and the holders of 
music copyrights. have openly demonstrated scepticism towards DAB. They argue that 
music offered in digital quality v1a DAB to every household keeps the consumer from 
buying their ·stored music' on COs and instead supports home recording on Digital 
Audio Tape (OAT). They also foresee many conflicts In the field of music copyright with 
DAB broadcasters. Their interests seem to go against the Introduction of DAB. 
On the political side. the Prime Ministers of the German Lander have the sole 
responsibility for broadcasting in Germany. They issued their first statement In March 
1993, according to which legislation for DAB and its particularities should clearly 
incorporate the existing dual system and must account for different 'Lander-wide'. 
regional and local radio stations. All existing stations of the FM band should be offered 
the possibility of DAB transmission, and room should be left for future radio stations. As 
reasonable as ll sounds. this demand can hardly be met by DAB. as It is technically 
bound to blocks of six transmission channels and has only limited frequency space. The 
legal and regulatory side of DAB is still unclear. this being a central reason why the 
introduction of DAB has been postponed In Germany. 
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DAB Platform e. V. 2 
-rhe German partners actively interested in DAB. formed an a lliance in the form of 
the national DAB-Platform e.V. It was established by the Ministry for Research and 
Technology (BMFT). The membership of approximately fifty represented public and 
commercial radio stations. Telecom. industry and research institutes. The board 
chairman is Dr. Frank Muller-Romer. a key figure for DAB, who Is based in the public 
service Bavarian Broadcasting company (Bayerischer Rundfunk). The Platform's 
declared aim is to continue pilot projects of DAB in 1995 and to introduce it publicly a t 
the Berlin Broadcasting Fair of 1997. 
The Platform is organized into four working groups with respective responsibilities for 
(1) testing and field work, (2) network planning. (3) recep tion a nd (4) strategies for 
introduction. It is striking that no measures have been instituted to include consumer 
interests or even market research. 
Special interests of the car industry 
The Radio Data System (RDS) currently allows for digitally coded information to be 
transmitted inaudibly and parallel to tbe radio programme, identifying the station. In 
essence. each digital service is a system for data transmission. Therefore it is possible to 
deliver a range of additional information. e.g. to transmit still pictures to accompany 
radio news or detailed meteorological maps on small LCD displays. Thus, data radio is 
bound to brtng about new commercial applications and legal problems which need 
clarification. Important s upport for DAB has come from the car industry which is 
interested in this data aspect. 
With support from the EU. several projects are on-going to replace the conventional 
type of traffic announcements on radio by a data intensive traffic information system 
whjch feeds an on-board computer. By supplying current data, it Is intended to give 
motorists individual guidance as to by-passes, s lowdowns. obstructions etc. either on a 
small screen or as spoken text. Experiments are under way to utilize a Traffic Message 
Channel (TMC) with a capacity for approximately sixty messages per minute which will 
supply motorists with Individ ual multi-lan guage information (called Pilot '93). 
These experiments actually pack digital information into conventional a na logue 
radio transmission. 
The TMC method will be adopted and further advanced by DAB and will also be 
available as a data service to interest groups such as the taxi and rent-a-car business 
(DAB-Platform. 1993: 22 fO. This actually means that rad io technology might be 
somehow taken over by the car industry. The TMC developments are competing with 
other projects initiated by the same lobby. t:.g. transmitters installed alongside main 
roads of highly urbanized regions or traffic guidance via infra-red signals. Obviously. the 
employment of these new technologies for traffic control \villlead to. as an advertisement 
of the car radio producer Blaupunkt says, 'the Intelligent car on intelligent roads' or, 
according to the same advertiSement. 'if we cannot multiply our roads. we should at 
least make better use of them'. 
European developments 
ln Great Britain, the BBC has had a stake in DAB developments from the very start. 
A DAB Forum was set up by the different interested bodies and lhe BBC participated in 
a steering group (DAB-Platform. 1994: Appendix 10). In addition the Radio Authority. 
newly established by the Broadcasting Act of 1990, has called for the introduction of 
DAB. In comparison to German DAB promoters. some detailed aspects are given 
different importance. For instance the question of a global standard is of much greater 
concern and so is the idea of holding on to parts of the FM and AM band 'for an 
unlimited period'. The attitude towards technology In general is more discriminating. 
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less deterministic and less built on the notion of automatic technological progress. 
Above all. the technical aspect should not be paramount, they have argued. 
The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) regards DAB as the next generation of radio 
technology and Is mainly concerned with getting necessary frequencies. To this purpose 
a World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) was set up in 1992. The conference 
then allotted transmission frequencies for satellite sound broadcasting to different world 
regions (DAB-Platform, 1994, Appendix 10; the EBU has also been publishing a DAB 
newsletter since 1993). 
Strategies to introduce DAB in Europe follow the traditional alliance of publlc actors 
(public service suppliers and Telecom) and the hardware producers in the electronics 
industry. Commercial radio suppliers are still reluctant If not opposed. The VPRT 
comments on this point: 
The past taught us that technical innovations succeed on markets 
only If consumers realize a distinct additional useful effect for 
themselves and accept the costs for i t as reason able. Special 
emphasise is to be put on the importance of compatibility which, In 
the case of DAB versus FM tran s mission d oes not exist. 
Misunderstood pressures of timing must be opposed In view of the 
proper relevance of development, Introduction and market 
orientation. To start off with transmission norms for the sake of 
industry and competition cannot but end u p in failure. The EC 
commission ought to be prevented from interfering by passing 'DAB 
regulations' (DAB-Platform. 1994: Appendix 17). 
First p ilot projects in DAB have already started in Bavaria (DAB-Platform 1994a). In 
1995 more will commence, most of them testing mobile radio reception. Covering all of 
Germany with digital audio programming is estimated to cost about OM 500 million 
(DAB-Platform, 1994: 13) 
Conclusion 
This analysis did not cover all aspects of European media technologies. bu t the 
sample should have demonstrated that Europe follows basically two patterns in the 
introduction of new technologies. The first one, represen ted by cable and satellite is 
steered mainly by market forces and/or national media politics. In the case of cable this 
has resulted In an extremely uneven distribution of cable In different parts of the 
continent. renecting a high degree of decentralization. If we take satellite. we fi nd that 
the market Is dominated by the one company. ASTRA. that established itself as a 
commercial enterprise beyond the reach of European regu lation. The result is a 
centralized structure. supplying practically all of Europe via a number of DBS satellites. 
The introduction of HDTV and DAB follow the old European tradition of 'top-to-
bottom' policies. A consortium of influential participants got together In order to push 
through 'their' technology which is purposely incompatible with all formerly established 
specifications. 1t appears that technology is to be accepted as a benevolence rather than 
by conviction. Enforcement strategies are mingled with prohibitions and seemingly strict 
regulations. For example. starting from a fixed day in the new millennium. DAB is to be 
the new exclusive audio technology. Almost one hundred years of radio history will come 
to an end: all older receiver sets will be useless. 
For HDTV as well as for DAB it seems that the technology Is given high priority and 
is being worked on by a group of interested manufactu rers and organizational users . 
Economically this may be defined as an innovation cartel; politically It is a n elitist 
European group, seeking mutual agreement. Their scheme for the introduction of new 
technologies seems highly non -transparent. Neither in theory nor In reality do 
consumers as prospective final users come anywhere into the process of planning. They 
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are to be confronted With a ·ready to wear' technology which they are expected to be 
enthusiastic about, purely on account of the technical achievement. They have never 
been included in the genesis and design of the new technologies. 
Public discourse about the need for new technologies is clearly avoided. An open 
and critical discussion - as took place in the US on HDTV - seems to be considered 
neither desirable nor acceptable. There has, of course. been some Information available 
on HDTV and DAB, but only in well spaced portions via public relations material, 
in sophisticated brochures and at orchestrated public exhibitions. In practise it is 
almost impossible to get information about technical problems or about conflicts 
amongst those who foster or attempt to block the Introduction of the new technology 
(and therefore it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the quality of the technology and 
the technical altematlves). 
If we analyse available and familiar technologies we come to realiZe that there is not 
only 'one' unalterable technical solution for a current problem, but instead different 
paths of development can be followed up. (Television with Its regional standards like 
PAL. SECAM, D2-MAC etc. is a vivid example). A comparison of the specifications for 
HDTV a nd DAB proposed in Europe and the US goes to show that the respective 
American version is much more open structured and adjustable than the decision-based 
European model. As a solution for digital audio transmission a US consortium is 
proposing an 'in-band' technology (or: FM-DAB) that allows for a gradual conversion to 
the digital age. The US already demonstrated in the case of HDTV that they can make 
better use of the flexibility of digital technologies than the Europeans. In the end it all 
depends on how the market reacts and it seems doubtful if a massive breakthrough in 
technology will be appreciated, as is common in Europe. PALplus has to be mentioned 
as an exception here. 
The funding for HDTV and DAB research came from a variety of public sources: 
mostly taxpayer's money, distributed on the national as well as on the European level: 
in ·the case of DAB subscription fees for public broadcasting were also used. Is. it 
acceptable to use public financial means for a limited purpose such as DAB? The 
question must also be raised if this type of HDTV or DAB policy really does serve the 
interests of European producers. In any case, the risks of private ownership are borne 
by the public, which clearly collides with the deregulatory and liberal rhetoric of present 
European politics. 
It is not fitting for the outgoing twentieth century to indulge in technology policies 
which have been planned almost In conspiracy within an elite circle. 'from top to 
bottom'. In the past, too often this did not work well. A more objective and Impartial 
approach to technology policies should be based on the following four principles: (1) The 
J.utegx-ation of critical expert knowledge in the planning process is highly desirable. to 
ask for expert opinion is the absolute minimum. The proposals outlines from the 
advocators which are usually much too optimistic should be compared to more realistic 
and. consequently more pessimistic reports from independent experts. (2) Technology 
policies must be made more transparen t: current policies can only be examined if the 
fmancial sources are clear, if interested parties act publicly and technical a ltematives 
are laid open. (3) Another prerequisite should be an examination of new technologies by 
an independent body. At present, inventors and investors are also responsible for final 
tests on the ultimate applicability of new technologies. Instead, a public and competitive 
testing of new technologies should be required, before technologies are launched and 
norms are declared binding. (4) Most technological innovations stem from small 
peripheral organizations - companies, research institutions etc. Large actors tend to 
think in large-scale terms and attempt to protect their dominant position in 
conventional technologies. Therefore they often develop less Innovative technologies. 
Particularly in Europe small inventors are often cut off from public funding and support, 
partly because they lack bureaucratic experience to reach fmancial 'honey pots'. partly 
because they are not taken seriously by large actors and bureaucracies. 
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